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1. Introduction   
 
The attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI) constitutes a fundamental element to 
support strategies that aim to achieve sustained economic growth in developing countries. 
This is because globalization and the attendant opening of the economies to competition 
require increased financial resources and technology, which would be impossible to obtain 
under a policy of autarky.
1  Though relatively well-established principles exist to explain why 
a multinational company may decide to move into a specific country, each experience has its 
idiosyncratic elements from which both theorists and policymakers can learn important 
lessons. There is less consensus, however, on the potential positive or negative effects that  
FDI may have on the host economy, and on what factors determine these effects.  
This chapter presents a case study of foreign direct investment (FDI) going into a 
small country. It analyzes the advent of Intel, manufacturer of microprocessors, to Costa Rica, 
a country that is very small indeed when compared with other potential locations for a 
company of that nature.   
The literature on FDI contains theoretical formulations on the factors that attract FDI 
and on policies oriented towards increasing FDI flows to a country.
2 There are also models of 
the effects that such investment has on the host country at both the micro- and macroeconomic 
levels (see Blomstrom and Kokko 1997). Recent attempts to use cross-country data to analyze 
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the determinants of FDI have faced identification problems, though researchers have managed 
to provide good insights on the issue (Shatz 1997b). The theoretical literature also highlights 
the impact of FDI on the development of the host country through technological spillovers and 
the increased availability of new inputs to both the multinational firm and to other local firms 
(Rodríguez-Clare 1996).  
Case studies are not as common in the literature, mainly due to data constraints. 
Available case studies, however, do provide evidence of the positive effects of FDI on the host 
economy, either through systematic analysis or by providing anecdotal, non-systematic 
evidence (Ranis and Schive, 1985; Meyanathan, 1994; Lim and Fong, 1991). Country-level 
studies have emphasized the macroeconomic impact, using aggregate data of FDI on country 
level aggregate variables (Galenson, 1985).  
This chapter studies the impact on the Costa Rican economy of Intel’s decision to 
move into that country in 1997. We use indicators of both direct effects and selected fiscal and 
macroeconomic effects as evidence; sometimes, however, these indicators are more 
qualitative than quantitative, due to the shortage of systematically collected data. We also 
examine training externalities, as well as the “signaling” effect that Intel has had on other 
firms’ decision to invest in Costa Rica, thus making Intel itself into a factor of attraction. 
Costa Rican economy has had to overcome to be more effective in attracting FDI, this is an 
important part of the discussion that follows, as is the fact that large FDI firms like Intel may 
help bring about needed institutional reforms by influencing the political balance through a 
new arrangement of stakeholders. 
The chapter starts by examining the rationale behind Intel’s decision to move to Costa 
Rica, and the main obstacles it faced.  The next section reviews the literature on the effects of 
FDI on the host economies. This is followed by a survey of the indicators that measure the 
effects of Intel’s arrival on the economy. We first look at some partial equilibrium 
indicators—gross income generated, not at shadow prices—and then, discuss potential general 
equilibrium consequences, such as the pressure on prices in the inputs market. For this 
purpose, we detail the findings of a short survey we carried out in Costa Rica. We then 
describe a number of potential training externalities and linkages, also showing data from a 
survey to Intel suppliers. The chapter closes with some general conclusions.   3
 
2. The Decision Process and Its Rationale: Intel Chooses Costa Rica 
 
A firm invests abroad either to exploit a foreign market (as have several companies 
that invested in Ireland to gain better access to the European Union) or to secure better access 
to certain inputs, especially cheap labor. This second motive is typical of FDI in small and 
poor countries, and certainly influenced Intel´s decision to invest in a microprocessor plant in 
Costa Rica in 1997.  
But why Costa Rica? Spar (1998), after analyzing Intel´s decision process, concluded 
that Costa Rica was chosen because it offered important location-specific advantages. Among 
these, the most important ones were the already existing tax exemptions for any firms 
satisfying certain conditions under the free zone scheme, the high educational level of the 
labor force, a stable political scenario, and a relatively corruption-free environment.  
 
Intel’s decision making 
During the process to select the location, the company carefully looked at six countries 
in addition to Costa Rica: Indonesia, Thailand, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Mexico. Some 
basic data about these countries is contained in Table 6-1. In the final stage, the short list 
included Mexico (State of Jalisco) and Costa Rica. Mexico seemed to have a better location in 
terms of transport costs to the North American market and the Pacific Basin, and it is also a 
much larger country. The relatively small size of Costa Rica to receive an investment of the 
dimension of Intel’s (US$300 million or equivalent to 2.1 percent of Costa Rican GDP), over 
two years with a total committed investment of about US$600 million, made Bob Perlman, 
one of Intel’s vice presidents, declare that bringing his company to Costa Rica was like 
“putting a whale in a swimming pool” (Spar, 1998). As discussed below, Intel would later 
recognize some bottlenecks, especially in the realm of infrastructure, whose elimination 
required a good deal of political and financial effort. There has been a consensus, however, 
that Costa Rica’s political institutions and educated labor force, combined with the free-zone 
regime benefits, more than offset the potential weaknesses that its small size imposes on   4
investors.
3  Executives of the company seem to have valued the fact that Intel’s bargaining 
power would be greater in a smaller country, as opposed to a larger one like Mexico. They 
also felt that Mexico, with both Federal and state governments, represented a double risk of 
policy changes. 
 
[insert table 6-1 here] 
 
The process of making Intel executives aware of the advantages that Costa Rica 
represented for the company was neither easy nor cheap in financial terms, though its cost-
effectiveness soon became evident. Intel’s decision process took more than one year, and 
involved four phases: prequalification, site research, contingent announcement and delivery, 
and start-up. Seven institutions were directly involved in the process on the side of the Costa 
Rican government, all under the direction of the Presidency and the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade, and with the coordination and support of CINDE (Coalición Costarricense de 
Iniciativas para el Desarrollo), a USAID-funded institution whose main responsibility is 
investment promotion. The institutions involved included the Ministry of Education and the 
Costa Rican Technology Institute. This would later become an “Intel Associate,” a status that 
allows its faculty and students to engage in educational exchange activities, share curricula 
with other Intel associates like the California Institute of Technology, and seek funding for 
technology development programs carried out by its own researchers.
4 
 
Strengths and weaknesses 
A study carried out in 1999 confirmed that other foreign investors’ perceptions of 
Costa Rica coincided with Intel’s assessment to a large extent (ARC1999). The 61 foreign 
investors interviewed ranked “political stability” and “well-educated labor force” as the top 
strengths of Costa Rica’s business environment (evaluated at above 8 on a scale from 1 to 
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10).
5  These companies cited “globalization and competition” as the most important force that 
was driving them to look for new locations to invest in. “Going abroad is often a defensive 
decision,” they affirmed (ARC 1999, 11). The top ten strengths included “good governance” 
and “effective legal system” (with grades between 7 and 8 using the same scale as above). At 
the bottom of the list were “geographical proximity to markets” and “size of the domestic 
market” (between 4 and 6 in the scale). A very important piece of information to come out of 
the survey was that 72 percent of the respondents claimed that they had heard, seen, and read 
more about Costa Rica as an investment prospect after Intel’s decision to set up a plant in that 
country. This reinforces the belief that investment decisions like Intel’s have an important 
“signaling” effect on other potential investors. Within the “awareness” section of the 
interview, the recent information about Costa Rica included, as the top-five characteristics its 
political stability, “relationship with the US,” “democratic government,” “educated labor 
force,” and “good governance” (ARC 1999, 30). Among Costa Rica’s strengths, respondents 
also mentioned the bilingual education and the “good quality of life.” 
Shortcomings in infrastructure services, especially roads, ports, and the airport, are 
mentioned throughout the survey as major drawbacks of Costa Rica. To a lesser extent, 
shortcomings were noted in power generation and distribution, and telecommunications 
infrastructure. The small size of the domestic market was also considered a weakness  
It is important to mention that Intel executives changed their perception of two factors 
after investing in Costa Rica. These were the quality and education of the labor force, and the 
quality of infrastructure services.
6 The former has been seen ex-post as one of the top 
strengths of Costa Rica as a location for production, and the latter as an important weakness 
whose correction requires a decisive effort on the side of the government. Training its 
workers, the so-called “intelization” of its labor force, proved relatively successful in terms of 
cost and time, due to the high absorption capacity of the employees. However, Intel was 
reconsidering some investments after potential bottlenecks were discovered in the 
telecommunications and electricity services. Intel executives were hoping for structural 
reforms in those sectors to ameliorate potential problems and allow them to launch ambitious 
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expansion plans. An internal document circulated by an Intel executive in July 1998 stated “It 
is clear from the outset that ICE (Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad) does not have a 
‘customer service’ philosophy and is not used to dealing directly with a private firm.”
7  
The explicit plan to promote investment in the country under a coordinated effort did 
pay off in the case of Costa Rica. The survey of potential investors and personal interviews 
with Intel executives reveal that search costs are considerably reduced when credible 
information is provided, and especially when there exists a well-coordinated effort to match 
the investor’s needs. As Spar (1998) and the ARC (1999) survey suggest, two important 
factors explain Intel’s decision to move into Costa Rica: the specific advantages the country 
offered—tax exemptions, good governance and institutional strength, and a highly educated 
labor force, among the top ones—and the explicit and coordinated effort by the Costa Rican 
government to convince Intel that going to that country was the right decision. A fundamental 
point, also emphasized in Spar (1998), is that the Costa Rican government did not promise 
Intel any special benefits, fiscal or other; rather, it offered existing advantages that any other 
foreign investment under similar conditions could obtain. The latter is a key factor in making 
FDI policy credible and reducing the perceived risk of policy change. 
 
3. The Impact of FDI on the Host Economy: Some Theoretical Considerations 
 
The impact of FDI in the host economy can be divided into four main areas: 
•  the direct effects caused by the investment and subsequent operation of the company, 
including the impact on workers and on local suppliers of inputs; 
•  macroeconomic effects, such as the impact on exports and imports, on GDP, on 
unemployment, on wages, and on prices of other inputs; 
•  fiscal effects related to extra fiscal income generated by the multinational firm, its 
suppliers and employees; and  
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•  the impact on productivity of the whole economy or at least the sector most related to the 
foreign investment, through externalities generated to other firms, including “forward” or 
“backward” linkages, technological spillovers, and employee training -that is not firm-
specific. 
 
  The first three effects do not require explanation. Thus, the rest of this subsection 
focuses on the fourth effect.  An important potential effect of FDI on host countries has to do 
with the impact on aggregate productivity, which happens through the externalities generated 
to other firms. This type of externalities is divided here into three main groups: i) knowledge 
and technological spillovers; ii) backward and forward linkages, which make available to 
domestic firms new or higher quality inputs that were not available before; and iii) training 
externalities. 
 
Knowledge spillovers  
The discussion on the existence of knowledge spillovers, or a primitive version of it, 
can be traced back to the 1970s, when emphasis was placed on improving business practices 
and the business “atmosphere” (Findlay 1978). More important externalities, however, may 
take place at the level of technological sophistication that is transferred to other sectors by the 
technicians and engineers of foreign firms in the form of tacit knowledge. This can be 
transmitted even informally, for example by the interaction of workers of different firms.
8  
These externalities are very difficult to measure. Some indirect measures, however, have 
shown their positive impact on aggregate productivity in Kenyan and Philippine 
manufacturing (Pack 1987).  
Linkages 
Rodríguez-Clare (1996) has shown that FDI may have important positive effects by 
changing the environment so that it becomes profitable to invest in some activities that were 
not profitable before the arrival of the multinational corporation. In this way, multinationals 
can lead to the local availability of inputs that were previously not obtainable in the host 
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economy, or to improvements in the quality of existing inputs. This important externality rests 
on the fact that those new products or services are made available not only to the multinational 
corporation, but also to other firms, both foreign and domestic. Moreover, because the inputs 
satisfy international quality standards, the competitiveness of the economy at the aggregate 
level is enhanced. These could be called “backward-forward” linkages.
9 
 
Reform and training externalities  
There is one type of “backward-forward” linkage that is not discussed in the literature 
but becomes especially important in economies where opposition to structural reforms, such 
as privatization, is strong. Consider a case where there is opposition to private participation in 
some type of essential infrastructure, like electricity generation and distribution. Suppose that 
the strength of the opposition forces, measured by the number of supporters, is a function of 
the quality of the service provided by the existing monopoly and/or the demand-supply gap or 
relative scarcity of the service. The arrival of the multinational corporation, and its demand for 
the service, in terms of both quantity and quality, may become an important force to weaken 
opposition to the reforms, by making evident the insufficiency of the existing service and the 
incapacity of the government to invest the required amounts to satisfy demand. Opening such 
infrastructure sectors to private participation may increase the quantity and quality of the 
supply of the input, and thereby raise the productivity of both foreign and domestic firms. 
Multinationals would in this indirect way play an important political role in pushing for the 
required structural reforms. 
Training externalities are an obvious benefit from FDI. From a theoretical perspective, 
this could be seen as another way to make a better input available not only to the multinational 
firm itself, but eventually to other firms, provided that the training involves some general, 
non-firm-specific skills.  
 
4. Intel in Costa Rica: A Whale in a Swimming Pool? 
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After the above theoretical considerations, there remains the important question of 
whether the effects of Intel’s investment have been positive or negative for the Costa Rican 
economy as a whole. The next two sections provide evidence that Intel’s investment has been 
positive for the Costa Rican economy in the short run and is likely to continue being so in the 
future. In this section we explore the direct effects of Intel; then, we discuss the 
macroeconomic effects. 
 
Wages and employment 
The amount paid as wages and benefits (which includes contributions by both 
employees and employer to social security, the national training program and mandatory 
savings, among others) to Intel employees between September 1997 and September 1998 was 
US$5.5 million, and US$25.29 million for the same period one year later (see Table 6-2). This 
last amount is equivalent to 0.2 percent of the 1999 Costa Rica’s GDP.
10  
 
[insert here table 6-2] 
 
The number of employees increased from 441 between September 1997 and 
September 1998, to 2,217 over the next 12 months, with an important component of 
professional employees (see Table 6-3). The total work force in Costa Rica was 1,383,452 in 
1999. 
 
[insert here table 6-3] 
 
As can be seen in Table 6-4, the average wage per employee is higher at Intel than the 
corresponding figure for the total manufacturing sector in Costa Rica. We lack the data 
required to tell how much of this difference is due to the fact that Intel hires better-qualified 
                                                                                                                                                         
employees relative to the use of inputs, and if the transmission of information between the headquarters and the 
branch is more costly.   10
workers, and how much to the fact that Intel pays higher wages than other companies to retain 
workers after they have been trained or “Intelized.” 
 
[insert here table 6-4] 
 
Domestic purchases 
Another indicator of the direct effect of a company like Intel on the host economy is its 
domestic purchases. Intel’s confidentiality policies did not allow access to the whole range of 
links with domestic suppliers, especially those that provide more sophisticated inputs.
 11 
However, using data from non-specialized providers of goods and services in 1998 allows us 
to set the lower bound on domestic purchases at US$19 million. The latter only includes 
providers of goods and services that are not related to the production process itself, but are 
related to construction, safety, office appliances, etc.  As a company benefiting from the “free-
zone” arrangement, Intel has to disclose information on purchases “imported” into the zone, 
i.e., purchases from suppliers outside this scheme. Information is not available, however, on 
purchases from other electronic companies or more sophisticated suppliers that are also within 
the free-zone scheme. As an example, if Intel had bought inputs from, let us say, Protek—a 
company within the free-zone plan that produces high tolerance electronic components—that 
would not be reported in Table 6-5 below.  
 
[insert here table 6-5] 
 
Investment 
The amount invested by Intel to December 1999 was close to 390 million dollars 
(equivalent to 2.6 percent of GDP), which is more than the US$300 million they originally 
planned to invest. The extra investment occurred in 1999, when Intel decided to start the 
production of the Pentium III processor. Around 65 percent of the total investment consisted 
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of machinery (Table 6-6). To understand the importance of this investment, notice that total 
FDI into Costa Rica in 1998 was $612 million. 
 
[insert here table 6-6] 
 
Total FDI as a share of GDP was 2.5 percent in 1991 and 3.2 percent in 1997. That 
share represented 4.4 percent and 3.9 percent of GDP in 1998 and 1999, respectively, 
according to the levels of investment committed by Intel and other companies, which places 
Costa Rica among the top countries in the world in that respect.  Among countries in South-
East Asia, the FDI contribution is, on average, 6 percent of GDP (Central Bank of Costa Rica, 
1997).  
 
5. Macroeconomic effects of Intel 
  
Overall growth 
The growth rate of the Costa Rican economy went from an average 4.9 percent 
between 1990 and 1996 to an average 7.3 percent between 1997 and 1999. More importantly, 
the growth rate in Costa Rica in the two years after Intel started operations—8 percent in both 
1998 and 1999—was the highest in Latin America; taking the two years combined, it has been 
the highest in the last three decades for Costa Rica. Considering that Intel started operations 
on November 1997, this appears to confirm that Intel had a large impact on the growth rate of 
GDP.  This is shown more clearly in Graph 6-1, where one should take into account that 
although Intel started operations only on November 1997, the investment took place 
throughout the year.
12  
 
[insert here graph Monthly Index of Economic Activity] 
                                                 
12 Monthly Index of Economic Activity measures the real variation on monthly production.  The graph  
represents the 12month average for the change rate of previous 12 months. 
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The increase in the growth rate during 1997 and the high growth rates of 1998 and 
1999 could also be explained by the fact that Costa Rica was coming out of a recession in 
1996. On that year, GDP grew by a mere 0.3 percent. Thus, to confirm that Intel was key in 
these very high growth rates, we must turn to Central Bank data that decomposes the growth 
rate with and without Intel (see graph 6-2). 
 
[insert here graph 6-2] 
 
The impact is clearer for 1999, when Intel accounted for 5 points out of the 8 percent 
growth rate. On that year, Intel accounted for $330 million of value added, approximately 7 
percent of GDP at domestic real prices. In addition to its contribution to GDP, Intel also had 
important macroeconomic effects through its impact on international trade figures. In terms of 
the trade balance, the data shows Intel’s net exports of about $205 million and $1496 million 
dollars for the years 1998 and 1999, respectively (Table 6-7). Those amounts represent around 
1.5 percent and 9.8 percent of GDP in the respective years.  
 
[insert here table 6-7] 
 
Foreign trade 
Intel´s gross exports represented 17.8 percent of the total amount of exports of the 
Costa Rican economy in 1998, and 38.7 percent in 1999. This contributed to an increase in the 
ratio of exports to GDP, which went from 33.2 to 43.5 in the 1997– 99 period. Moreover, the 
ratio of external-debt service to exports fell from 4.1 percent to 3 percent in the same years 
(without Intel exports, this ratio would have been 4.9 percent in 1999).  
The openness ratio, that is exports plus imports over GDP, increased from 70 percent 
to 83 percent between 1997 and 1999. It was already growing before then, but, as graph 6-3 
shows, this trend clearly accelerated in 1997.  
 
[insert here graph 6-3]   13
 
Intel’s most dramatic impact has been on the trade balance, which went from a deficit of 
$497.6 million in 1997 to a surplus of  $632.1 million in 1999.
13  This was Costa Rica’s first 
surplus in 50 years. Most of the impact is purely an accounting matter, however, since Intel’s 
surplus is then repatriated as profits, and this shows as a strong deficit in the “rents” 
component in the current account. This component went from a deficit of $254.5 million in 
1997 to a deficit of $1,67 billion in 1999. What is the net effect? In 1999, Intel’s net exports 
were $1.5 billion, and it repatriated profits  for $1.2 billion so the net effect on the current 
account was almost $300 million positive. Appendix II has the complete balance of payments 
for the years 1996 through 1999.   
Moreover, Intel helped to strengthen the diversification of Costa Rican trade patterns, 
increasing the number of countries with which that nation trades as well as the types of goods 
that are traded. The share of exported goods from the primary sector fell from 42.4 percent to 
only 23.8 percent in the 1997–1999 period, while the participation of goods manufactured 
within the free zones in total exports went from 21 percent to 54 percent in the same period. 
As the next Graph 6-4 shows, the share of exported goods from the primary sector was already 
declining before Intel arrived, but the tendency clearly accelerated after 1997. 
 
[insert here graph 6-4] 
 
Intel has a very diversified trade pattern in terms of the countries to which the 
production is exported. Its imports are more concentrated, as can be seen in Tables 6-8, 6-9, 
and 6-10.  
 
[insert here table 6-8] 
 
It is worth noticing the amount exported to Malaysia (although this falls significantly in 
1999) and, in general, the important commercial links Intel has developed with major South 
East Asian economies and Japan. 
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[insert here table 6-9] 
 
The company also has a positive trade balance with European countries, as observed in 
Table 6-10. The strongest links are with the United Kingdom and Germany. That has helped 
Costa Rica strengthen commercial links with the European Union, which has historically been 
a difficult market for manufactured exports from developing countries. In this respect, 
although the externalities are discussed below, one can think of Costa Rican executives 
“learning” about doing business in markets otherwise closed, and becoming potentially 
important assets for other companies interested in having access to those foreign markets. In 
terms of regional diversification, the most important change Intel introduced in the country’s 
historical patterns was an increase in the trade flows with Asian countries (exports to Asian 
countries almost tripled between 1997 and 1999, increasing from $148.1 million to $434 
million). Intel has important investments in Malaysia, the Philippines, and more recently, 
China (Spar, 1998). Table 6-11 shows the important role of Intel in strengthening Costa Rica's 
trade relations with Asia and Europe. 
 
[insert here table 6-10] 
 
[insert here table 6-11] 
 
Fiscal effects 
There is a now a discussion in Costa Rica about the “dual economy” arrangement that 
exempts firms in the Export Processing Zones (EPZs) from paying taxes. This imposes a 
burden on the rest of the economy and is made all the more problematic by the fact that the 
firms in the EPZs constitute the most dynamic sector of the economy. Thus, unless other 
measures are taken, tax revenue as a share of  GDP will fall progressively in the years ahead, 
leading to either higher taxes for domestic firms, higher deficits and the associated 
macroeconomic problems, or imposing the need of an expenditure cut.    15
If there is unemployment, so that no opportunity cost is associated with the workers 
hired by the Export Processing Zone companies, then all the profits generated by the EPZ 
companies are additional profits; that is, they do not reduce the profits generated by the 
domestic economy. In other words, in the presence of unemployment, there is no fiscal cost 
attributable to the EPZ companies. But, of course, even if there is aggregate unemployment, 
the kind of workers hired by EPZ companies in general, and Intel in particular, have a high 
probability of getting alternative job opportunities. The latter implies the existence of a 
positive fiscal cost. To put it simply, if Intel had not come to Costa Rica, the domestic 
economy would be larger, as it would have more highly qualified workers at its disposal, and 
thus it would generate more tax revenue for the Government. 
One hypothesis is that the fiscal cost changes over time. In the short run, it is likely 
that FDI in EPZs generates extra employment, and thus the fiscal cost is low. In the medium 
run, the fiscal cost increases, because of the argument laid out above. Then, in the longer run, 
the fiscal cost disappears, since the EPZ entails a tax holiday of 12 years, after which the 
company starts paying taxes like domestic firms. This is reinforced by the possible reaction of 
supply to increased labor demand. For example, the supply of electrical engineers will surely 
increase greatly as a consequence of demand from Intel, so it is unlikely that any other firm 
will suffer a shortage of electrical engineers because of Intel in the long run. 
Presumably, the “gamble” with the EPZ scheme is that the revenue lost is minimal for 
two reasons: first, because unemployment exists, there is little displacement of labor from 
domestic firms, and second, domestic firms will not go to the EPZs due to the requirements of 
the scheme. Moreover, whatever displacement there is, the resulting reduction in tax revenue 
is presumably more than justified (and compensated for or even reversed in the long run) by 
the positive effects of FDI through other channels. Certainly, this topic needs further empirical 
work to be clarified. 
 
Externalities 
In order to have some indicators of the general equilibrium effects Intel has had on the 
economy, a survey was carried out on twenty firms that were considered potential competitors 
of Intel in the market for inputs. Special emphasis was placed on determining the effect on   16
wages, because of the obvious theoretical implications and also because of comments made in 
the newspapers about the so-called “Intel effect.” Firms in the electronics industry claimed 
that Intel had put pressure on the wages for skilled labor (La Nación, 1997). The survey asked 
respondents about the effect Intel’s arrival had had on the prices of certain inputs and their 
general perception of the fact that Intel had become a local competitor in the inputs market.
14 
The survey also asked several questions to determine whether these “competitor” firms 
perceived some positive effects on their productivity as a consequence of Intel’s operations. 
The firms surveyed, on average, export more than 60 percent of their production but also sell 
an important fraction in the internal market (around 30 percent). The composition of their 
work force was 20 percent engineers, less than 15 percent administrative employees, and the 
rest relatively unskilled labor, the equivalent of what Intel calls “technicians.” The firms were 
selected from the pool of firms registered at CINDE. The fact that the firms that we chose to 
survey are involved with CINDE may indeed have introduced a selection bias. The survey 
firms perhaps showed a special interest in CINDE because they may have benefited more 
from Intel's arrival to the country.  The results of the survey are summarized below. 
 
Effect on the Labor Market and Other Inputs Prices  
The average effect of Intel on the labor market—measured by the pressure on overall 
wages—was estimated as a 4.5, measured on a scale from 1 (no effect) to 7 (a very large 
effect).
15 When specifically asked about wage increases and changes in the benefits to 
employees, seven firms said they had increased wages after Intel’s arrival, but five of those 
increased wages only to engineers. Increases were, on average, 10 percent to 12 percent in 
nominal terms over and above the hypothetical contractual increase those employees would 
have received in the absence of any pressure in the labor market. All of those who granted 
increases, however, declared that those increases did not affect their competitive position in 
the market over the medium term.
16 
                                                 
14 Eleven firms responded to the request for information. 
15 In most of these questions the scale chosen was from 1 to 7, 1 being always the “best” outcome, and 7 being 
the “worst” outcome. Values closer to one are thus “better.” 
16 Moreover, most of these companies are foreign-owned, so the increase in wages was a net benefit to Costa 
Rica, since the owners of capital who lost as a consequence were foreigners.   17
Also, 80 percent of them perceived the increase in real wages as temporary, especially 
given the new programs established by the Costa Rican Technology Institute and the 
University of Costa Rica, and the expected increase in the supply of engineers and technicians 
in the future.
17 
At the time of the survey, only three firms said that they had hired personnel 
previously employed at Intel, and all of them perceived  performance of these employees as 
above the average or average. Eight firms said they had hired graduates of the “Electronics 
Diploma,” a one-year program aimed at preparing potential employees in electronics firms at 
the level of technicians. This program was specifically created after Intel’s arrival in Costa 
Rica, under an agreement with the Technology Institute. Those firms that hired people from 
such program believed that they had significantly benefited from its creation. All the firms 
interviewed, with the exception of one, declared that Intel’s arrival was good for the formation 
of human capital in the country and the training of labor. Only two firms admitted to having 
changed their training policies—including expenditures devoted to training—as a result of 
Intel’s competitive pressure on the labor market. 
  From the answers of the firms surveyed it is possible to conclude that Intel did indeed 
have an effect on the price of labor, especially skilled labor. The “Intel Effect” was thus a 
reality. This effect, however, may well be temporary. Intel’s arrival in Costa Rica apparently 
increased not only the demand for labor with specific skills, but also its supply, through the 
agreements with the educational institutes and the creation of specific programs to train 
potential workers in the electronics industry.  
  The survey included questions regarding the prices of inputs, other labor, and changes 
in their prices as a result of Intel’s pressure on the market. On a scale from 1 (a decrease in 
prices) to 7 (an increase in prices), the declared effect was, on average, 4.5, that is, practically 
no change. The firms did notice an increase (5.5 on average) in the price of certain services 
but that increase might not be linked to Intel’s pressure on the market, according to the survey. 
 
Training and the Intel Associate Status  
                                                 
17 According to the data, enrollment in the engineering schools at the Universities almost doubled after 1997 
(interview with officials of the Costa Rican Technology Institute, August 1999).    18
The survey had questions designed to shed some light on the training externalities, 
potential spillovers, and linkages derived from Intel’s arrival. In terms of training externalities, 
some answers were already discussed above, for instance, the fact that firms were hiring 
people graduated from the new program created at the Technology Institute, as well as the fact 
that the enrollment in engineering fields in the two most important higher education 
institutions of the country almost doubled in two years. At the Technology Institute, for 
instance, the number of students enrolled in engineering fields grew from 577 in the first 
quarter of 1997 to 874 in the year 2000, that is, from 9.5 percent to 12.5 percent of the total 
number of students enrolled. More details on this issue are worth mentioning.  
In 1999, faculty members of the Costa Rican Technology Institute visited Cal Tech 
with the objective of redesigning the curriculum of the local programs in Costa Rica and 
opening new exchange possibilities for students and faculty. On the other hand, as mentioned 
earlier, these “Intel Associates” can apply for Intel-provided funds devoted to specific 
research and development programs, competing on an equal basis against other Intel Associate 
institutions around the world. An estimate of the funds Intel channels through this mechanism 
every year is about US$300 million.  
The strongest link was created by Intel and the Costa Rican Technology Institute 
(ITCR). The “Intel Associate” status also involved: i) the creation of an additional one-year 
“certificate” program for technical high school or academic high school graduates to update 
their technical skills; ii) the creation of a one-year “associate degree” program for qualified 
applicants and graduates of the one-year “certificate program” focused on manufacturing 
semiconductors and iii) a program of language training that ITCR would provide to foreigners 
arriving in Costa Rica (Spanish) and Intel employees hired in Costa Rica (English). All this 
required the approval and supervision of the Ministry of Education. 
 
Informal transmission of knowledge spillovers 
Even though it is difficult to measure the spillovers properly in terms of know-how and 
technological capacity, questions were asked about the interaction of technicians and 
engineers of different companies—including Intel—and potential gains from such interaction. 
Concretely, firms were asked whether they had formal channels of interaction between their   19
employees and people working at Intel. Only two of them mentioned some type of formal 
interaction at the level of skilled labor, but none at the level of unskilled labor. To the question 
of whether such interaction took place in the academic world, in professional organizations, or 
some other way, the answer was that there had been only informal contacts with Intel 
personnel. No firm had evidence that their employees benefited from informal or formal 
contact with Intel employees. 
It is important to mention here that companies like Intel have very strict confidentiality 
policies due to the competitive pressure in the market. These policies notwithstanding, Intel 
agreed to allow us to carry out a survey to the suppliers. The results are described in the next 
section.
18 
  
6. Linkages: back to suppliers 
 
The attraction by Intel of other, more sophisticated suppliers is another important 
effect of Intel’s operations in Costa Rica. In 1998, for example, the American company 
Photocircuits announced a 40 million dollar investment in Costa Rica, and projected a work 
force of 700 employees. 
 
The different suppliers and their reactions 
According to available information, there are more than 200 Intel suppliers locally, 
ranging from very small service providers to larger companies especially created to supply a 
specific input to Intel. Intel declared that the most important suppliers of inputs were 63 firms 
and more than 100 were providing services. The areas in which these suppliers are involved 
include: 
Group 1, Services. Cafeteria service, computer services, document translation,  garbage 
disposal, janitorial, pest control, security, training services (including language courses), hotel 
services, transport, consulting. 
Group 2, Manufactured goods. Computer equipment, office equipment, packaging 
material, office supplies, spare parts, construction material, security equipment. 
                                                 
18 A second paper, as mentioned above, explores in detail the results of the survey.  A total of 43 suppliers of 
goods and 37 suppliers of services answered the questionnaire.   20
  The assessment of the economic effect generated through the suppliers, including 
indicators of linkages and technological spillovers, would require a detailed analysis of Intel’s 
purchases, training programs with suppliers, etc. We would have liked more specific 
information from some important companies that had set up in Costa Rica and supply Intel, 
such as RVSI, NTK, Phillips, Magnéticos Toroid de Costa Rica, Tiros, Alphasem Corp., Delta 
Design S.A. and Esec USA, Inc. The data obtained through the survey, however, allowed us to 
give some insights of the Intel effect.
19 
  Among providers of goods and services to Intel, the arrival of Intel to Costa Rica was 
perceived as “very positive” for the economy (60% of the firms). Tables 6-12 shows the 
composition of the activities in which suppliers are involved. 
 
[insert here table 6-12] 
 
In terms of training externalities, 35% of the providers of services declared to have 
received training from Intel (around 80% of the training took place at Intel´s plant). Among 
providers of inputs, 17% of the firms declared to have engaged in some kind of training by 
Intel. It is important to mention that 40% of the providers of inputs carry out more than 60% 
of the production process inside Costa Rica.  Around 18% of the providers of goods stated that 
they had changed their organizational practices due to their activities with Intel. Around 8% of 
the providers of goods and 9% of the providers of services reported some changes in their 
                                                 
19 Ideally, a “linkage index” could be created and compared for different FDI firms to measure potential 
technological externalities. This index is based upon the idea of the spillover effect of FDI and is an imperfect 
way to approximate the ideal linkage index as discussed in Rodríguez-Clare (1996), which links the labor input 
requirements by the FDI and supplier firms. 
The index could be of the following, rather rough, form: 
TE
i
i
VHI
LI
∑
=  ii 
where LI is the linkage index, VHIi is the value of the total amount of high technology input i purchased 
locally, and TE is the number of employees at the lowest level of skills (técnicos u operarios). Inputs will be 
classified as technologically more or less demanding. The rationale is that some firms could indeed be 
demanding a large amount of local inputs per employee, but those inputs could be technologically not 
demanding, which reduces the scope of potential technological externalities of that firm.  
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product variety due to Intel, which is very important in terms of the backward-forward 
linkages discussed above. 
 
[insert here graph 6-5] 
 
Only two years after Intel had been established in Costa Rica –by the time of the 
survey--  around 10% of the firms surveyed were selling more than 50% of their total output 
to Intel. Another 8% were selling between 10 and 50%. The latter, along with the reported 
changes in lines of products and organizational forms in only two years, leads us to believe 
that the backward-forward externalities –making available newer and better goods and 
services to firms other than Intel—could indeed be taking place. 
In term of joint ventures with foreign partners, 12% of goods providers reported to be 
associated with a foreign firm. Among those, 80% have received training by the foreign 
partner, both in Costa Rica and abroad.   Training externalities and forms of technology 
transfers were thus already showing up after a short period of time. 
A first glance at the aggregate results of the survey, considering the fact that Intel had 
been in Costa Rica for only two years at the time the questionnaire was sent to them, allows us 
to say that the effects discussed in the theoretical literature seem to be already taking place. 
Important gains are showing not only at the macro, but also at the microeconomic level.   
 
Supporting the development of suppliers 
Thre have been initiatives by the government to develop and support suppliers of firms 
in the free-zones. One is the Program for High Technology Multinational Enterprises, 
supported by the IADB, which will start in 2000. On the other hand, CINDE and 
PROCOMER have carried out a program to develop suppliers since 1997.  Such programs are 
not meant to support specifically suppliers of Intel, but to help any firm whose intention is to 
supply inputs to exporting firms under the free-zone agreement. Of course, given the high 
proportion of the total demand for inputs generated by Intel, since 1997 this firm has become a 
fundamental player in the latter program.   22
  A fundamental characteristic of the inputs that Intel requires is that they have to satisfy 
international standards of quality. In addition, they must satisfy norms of environmental 
safety.
20  Quality and environmental safety have indeed been the two most important areas of 
advisory work with suppliers. The idea of the program to support Intel suppliers was 
supported by the United Nations and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) from 1997, 
and the program itself was formulated in 1998. It is finally being implemented in 2000, with 
IDB support. The three main sectors in which firms will be developed are machinery and 
parts, plastics, and packaging (including the materials for shipping at the ports).  
In the program carried out previously by CINDE and PROCOMER, successful 
examples are companies that provide freight transportation services to firms in the free-zones, 
as well as one that produces high electric resistance packaging materials for Intel. There are 
also several small firms that now provide service to Intel’s machinery and manufacture parts 
for repairing sophisticated machinery at Intel. Again, all the inputs and services under this 
program are made available not only to Intel or to firms in the free-zone, but also to all firms 
in the economy. 
  The survey of Intel competitors in the inputs market, already discussed above, also 
allowed us to obtain some indicators of Intel effects. The arrival of FDI firms such as Intel 
have made available inputs that did not exist before. These new inputs can be used, as 
mentioned, not only by the FDI firm, but also by all firms in the economy, thereby enhancing 
aggregate competitiveness. Eight firms maintained that some supplier of inputs had improved 
their quality after Intel’s arrival, and specifically mentioned a certain type of service. As an 
example, packaging was mentioned as an input that had become more sophisticated in some 
specific firm, directly or indirectly due to Intel demand for similar services. The firms 
surveyed did not observe a reduction in prices of inputs after 1997, though they claimed that 
more specialized input providers had started businesses in Costa Rica, which could potentially 
benefit their firms. They did not mention any specific example of inputs under this category. 
Summarizing, only two years after Intel’s arrival in Costa Rica, similar firms were seeing 
some evidence of backward-forward linkage effects through new or better input providers. 
                                                 
20 These international standards are under the classification ISO-9000 (quality) and ISO-4000 (environmental 
norms).   23
Two questions were asked regarding the general perception or assessment of the Intel 
effect: first, the perception of the effect on the specific firm being surveyed, and second, the 
perception of the overall effect in the economy.
21 Firms ranked Intel’s effect on their own 
companies  at 2.5, within a scale ranging from 1 (very positive) to 7 (very negative). The 
impact on the overall economy was estimated as highly positive as well (between 1 and 2). 
These rankings thus turned out surprisingly positive, even among firms that could be seen as 
competitors of Intel in certain input markets in Costa Rica. 
 
Institutional Reforms and the Signaling Effect 
An important component of the effect of FDI in host countries, as discussed 
throughout, consists of the so-called backward-forward linkages. In this respect, by 1999 Intel 
had started  to play an important role in the political discussion about the reform of the power 
and telecommunications sectors in Costa Rica. Intel has very clearly avoided any intervention 
in the political debate about opening up telecommunications, but it has been used by the 
proponents of reform as an element in favor of opening up the market. The opponents also use 
it, saying that a firm such as Intel decided to come to Costa Rica despite the supposedly bad 
telecommunication services. The political balance among stakeholders in this realm seems to 
have changed after Intel’s arrival, and the reforms are more likely to take place, benefiting not 
only Intel, but also all other companies in the Costa Rican economy, and even the consumers 
themselves. This development could be seen as a clear effect of the backward-forward linkage 
type, in which an institutional reform was required. 
  A very important externality that arises from Intel’s decision to move into Costa Rica  
is the “signaling” or informational externality to other firms that could potentially invest in the 
country. As was mentioned above, the survey carried out with multinational firms reflected 
that those firms had heard more about Costa Rica after 1997, the year in which Intel moved 
into Costa Rica (ARC 1999). If we consider the research costs that firms have to undergo 
when deciding where to invest abroad as a fixed entry cost, relatively small firms might 
decide not to enter because of their inability to cover such costs. The signaling effect by Intel 
                                                 
21 Specifically, these questions were: “In general, for your company, Intel’s arrival has been…?”, and “In your 
opinion, the effect of Intel investment on the Costa Rican economy has been…?”.     24
could trigger entry decisions by smaller firms under such conditions. A second possibility in 
this respect is that large firms which could financially afford those entry costs, would anyway 
“free-ride” on Intel's location-search investment, and thereby reduce part of their costs of 
going into the country. This is especially the case considering that Intel did not get any legal 
or fiscal firm-specific benefits, but only the same type of arrangement any other firm could get 
in the same conditions. The fact that potential entrants into foreign markets benefit from 
previous entrants, who already incurred the research costs and developed commercial linkages 
has been explored by Aitken et al. (1997) from a theoretical perspective. 
 
7. Conclusions  
 
Though the decision of the Intel to move into Costa Rica in 1997 came as a surprise in 
some academic and policy circles, this paper strongly suggests that the conditions of the 
country could easily justify this decision from a theoretical and practical perspective. Previous 
research and interviews with Intel executives confirmed that the most important factors 
attracting Intel to Costa Rica were its political stability, highly educated labor force, relatively 
corruption-free environment, and the credibility of the legal institutions. Some weaknesses 
were also found: the small size of the country and its poorly developed and maintained 
infrastructure services, especially its roads, ports, and airports, and to a lesser extent electricity 
and telecommunications. The process of attracting Intel required a well-coordinated effort that 
involved ministries, independent agencies, and institutions of higher education. The fiscal 
benefits under the Costa Rican free-zone regime for FDI companies was also a key 
determinant in Intel’s decision process. 
The gross income generated by Intel in terms of net exports, investment, wages and 
benefits, and local purchases is very important for the Costa Rican economy. Net exports, and 
the economy as a whole have been growing at a significantly higher rate since 1997. Also, the 
composition of Costa Rica’s exports has shown a decline in the share of natural resource-
related exports and an increase in manufactures.   25
There were some worries, however, regarding the potential negative effects of Intel’s 
arrival from a general equilibrium perspective. Concretely, it was believed that the increase in 
demand for certain inputs would raise their price, affecting other sectors negatively. The 
survey carried out with Intel competitors in the inputs market showed that such negative 
effects have indeed been felt, especially in terms of an increase in wages for skilled labor. 
Most firms, however, saw the effect as temporary and foresaw an increase in the supply of 
skilled labor through the creation of new programs in higher education institutions and the 
higher enrollment in existing engineering programs. A majority of them saw Intel’s arrival in 
Costa Rica as good for themselves and the Costa Rican economy. A survey of Intel local 
suppliers was initially thwarted by Intel’s strict confidentiality policies, which do not allow 
Intel executives to disclose the names of their suppliers and prevent the suppliers from giving 
any information regarding their commercial relation with the company. After gaining access 
to those records, subsequent research will analyze that aspect in more detail.  
  Available information supports the existence of positive externalities generated by 
Intel in the Costa Rican economy. Specifically, Intel has helped to create new training 
programs in higher education institutions, and these institutions have become “Intel 
Associates,” which allows them to exchange curricula, faculty, and students with Intel 
Associates around the world, and to obtain substantial research funds. New investors and 
potential investors in Costa Rica claimed to have heard more about Costa Rica after Intel’s 
decision, showing that the investment by Intel does play a signaling role to other 
multinationals. Moreover, new suppliers of Intel have arrived in Costa Rica. In terms of 
informal communication among employees, especially at the engineering level, the survey say 
that there is no evidence of knowledge spillovers. Data shown above, collected through a 
survey to Intel suppliers, has shown the effects predicted by the theoretical literature are 
indeed taking place. The latter was so in spite of the fact that the survey was carried out only 
two years after Intel´s arrival to Costa Rica. 
        The overall effect of Intel moving into Costa Rica appears to be unambiguously 
positive. Though the data shown in this chapter has shortcomings, the evidence points in the 
direction of a positive net effect, especially when the medium- and long-term effects are 
considered. Intel has increased the export capacity of the country, has diversified exports, has 
helped to attract other companies into the country, has established important links with the   26
education community to develop human resources for the benefit of the whole industry sector, 
and has changed the balance among stakeholders in the in the public discussion regarding 
important institutional reforms. Moreover, the development of local suppliers has been fast 
and ambitious, thanks to a coordinated effort by the government. Even though the free-zone 
regime implies a substantial fiscal sacrifice in terms of tax collection, the figures shown above 
suggest that those foregone revenues could be money well spent, if they help establish an 
industrial base that becomes the engine of Costa Rica’s future economic growth.   27
Appendix I 
 
Summary of Benefits Under the Costa Rica’s Free-Zone Incentive Package 
 
The following are the benefits program under which 190 companies had come to Costa Rica 
as of June 1997. These firms are distributed in eight different industrial parks. Intel is 
geographically located in a different area but receives the benefits as though it were in one of 
such parks. 
 
i)  100 percent exemption on import duties on raw materials and capital goods. 
ii)  100 percent exemption on taxes on profits for eight years, and 50 percent for 
the following four years. 
iii)  100 percent exemption on export taxes, local sales, and excise taxes, as well as 
taxes on repatriation of profits. 
iv)  100 percent exemption on municipal and capital taxes. 
v)  No restrictions on repatriation of profits or foreign currency management. 
vi)  Fully expedited on-site customs clearance. 
vii)  Possibility of selling products to local exporters. 
viii)  Possibility of selling up to 40 percent of the production locally, exempt from 
sales tax. 
 
Intel also received the benefits offered to firms located in the Puntarenas free trade 
zone: 
 
i)  Longer exemption from taxes on profits: 100 percent for twelve years and 50 
percent for the following six years. 
ii)  Every year, for five years, the government repays the investors a percentage of 
its payroll in the chosen base year (15 percent the first year, 13 percent the 
second, 11 percent the third, 9 percent the fourth, and 7 percent the fifth year). 
iii)  Subsidized training programs in a way that practically results in three months 
of free labor for the firm, provided workers receive on-site training. 
 
Source: Spar (1998).  28
 
Appendix II 
 
Balance of Payments 
 
 
        1996  1997  1998  1999  * 
I.  Current Account (A+B+C+D)  -264.1 -480.9  -520.7  -583.7
           
 A.  Goods  -249.2 -497.6  -399.0  632.1
   Exports FOB  3,774.1 4,220.6  5,538.3  6,616.0
   Imports FOB  -4,023.3 -4,718.2  -5,937.3  -5,983.9
         
 B.  Services  20.3 140.2  233.6  357.9
   Transportations  -250.8 -189.1  -213.6  -183.3
   Travels  374.0 394.3  504.6  583.2
   Others Services  -102.9 -65.1  -57.4  -42.0
         
 C.  Income  -184.6 -249.0  -468.5  -1,685.2
   Compensation of employees  1.9 5.5  -7.1  -7.0
   Investment income  -186.5 -254.5  -461.4  -1,678.2
         
 D.  Current Transfers  149.5 125.5  113.2  111.5
   General Government  45.7 37.5  39.8  39.5
   Other Sectors  103.8 88.0  73.4  72.0
         
II.  Capital and Financial Account (A+B)  67.5 508.5  547.7  1,063.7
         
 A.  Capital Account  28.1 0.0  0.0  0.0
   Capital transfers  28.1 0.0  0.0  0.0
   Non-produced non-financial assets  0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0
         
 B.  Financial Account  39.4 508.5  547.7  1,063.7
   Direct Investment Abroad  421.3 402.5  606.9  578.3
   Portfolio Investment  -21.5 74.4  -85.6  232.5
   Other Investment  -360.3 31.6  26.5  252.9
         
III.  NET ERRORS AND OMISSIONS  142.0 189.1  -176.6  -
         
IV.  Reserve Assets  54.5 -216.7  149.6  -480.0
         
V.  Total Balance of Payments (I+II+III+IV)  0.0 0.0  0.0  0.0
* “Net errors and omissions” for 1999 include “Other Investment” from B. Financial Account.  
Source:  Central Bank of Costa Rica.  
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Table 6-1 
Human Development Indicators 
 
        Source:  Human Development Report. UNDP (1999). 
 
 
105 67 79 39  34 50 45
221.5 165.8 784.0 319.3  70.5 348.6 9.3
7.1 7.8 3.5 1.4  5.5 2.8 3.7
1985-
1996
8.6 4.8 569.8 162.9  16.0 40.7 17.8
1996  8.5 4.0 17.2 1.9  2.9 28.7 16.2
1,110 2,740 4,790 8,950  4,820 3,700 2,680
85.0 94.7 84.0 96.5  95.2 90.1 95.1
64 59 80 79  77 70 66
65.1 68.8 66.8 72.9  74.9 72.2 76.0
46 29 19 -  6 13 4
Indicator  Argentina  Chile MexicoCosta 
Rica
Indonesia ThailandBrazil
Human Poverty Index                         
(HPI-1 rank) 
Combined first, second and third 
level gross enrolment ratio                             
(%) 
Life expectancy at birth                        
(years) 
Real GDP per capita                                 
(PPP$ 
1997)
Adult Literacy rate                                            
(%) 
IDH 
GNP                                                                    
(US$ billions) 
1997
GNP annual growth rate                                
(%) 1975-
95
Average annual rate of inflation                    
(%)   33
 
   Source: PROCOMER.  Annual Report of Intel Operation. 
 
 
Wages   3.73  16.35 
Benefits  1.77  9.24 
Total  5.50  25.59 
Sept 97     
Sept 98
Sept 98     
Sept 99
Table 6-2                         
Intel Wages Sept. 97 to Sept. 99   
(Millions of Dollars)  34
 
Source:  PROCOMER Annual Report of Intel Operation. 
 
 
Professional Employees  359  562 
Technicians  80  554 
Operators and Ohters 2  1101 
Total Employees  441  2,217        
Sept 98   
Sept 99
Table 6-3                             
Intel Employment                       
Sept. 97 to Sept. 99 
Sept 97     
Sept 98   35
 
Source: Own estimates with data from PROCOMER . 
 
 
Intel  562  615 
Total Sector  389  406 
Sept-98 Sept-99  Wage per employee 
 Table 6-4                                 
Manufacturing Sector                         
(dollars per month)  36
 
 
Table 6-5                            
Intel, Lower Bound on                 
Domestic Purchase                   
1998-1999 
(million dollars) 
1998  1999 
Services  14.5 17.5
Others  4.9 5.7
Total Purchases  19.4 23.2
     Source: Own estimates with data from PROCOMER 
   37
 
   Source: Own estimates with data from PROCOMER. 
  
 
Land  16.4  5.8  1.4 
Buildings  36.5  50.6  15.1 
Machinery 20.3  156.7  72.1 
Transportation 0.0 0.0  0.0 
Equipment  1.3 4.3  2.5 
Total Investment 74.5  217.4  91.0 
Dec-98  Dec-99 
Table 6-6                                    
Intel Investment                               
Dec. 1997 – Dec. 1999                     
(Millions of dollars) 
Dec-97   38
 
Source: Central Bank of Costa Rica.  
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             Source: Central Bank of Costa Rica. 
 
    Graph 6-2
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   Source: PROCOMER 
  
 
Total Inputs Capital 
Assets  Others 
1998  987.2  781.7  616.8  158.2  6.7  205.5 
1999  2,558.6  1,062.6 983.8  73.0  5.8  1,496.0
 Table 6-7                                              
INTEL, Trade Balance                                     
1998 -1999                                               
(Millions of 
dl l )
Imports
Exports  Balance Year   41
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  *Includes industrial and free-zone exports. 
Source: Central Bank of Costa Rica. 
 
         Graph 6-4
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     Source:  PROCOMER 
 
 
Barzil  1.8  0.1  1.7  4.5  0.0  4.5 
Mexico  14.2  1.3  12.9  60.4  1.6  58.8 
United States  409.2  718.8  -309.6  1,391.2  988.6  402.7 
Canada  1.1  0.7  0.4  5.7  0.0  5.7 
Table 6-8                                                       
INTEL Exports and Imports 1998 - 1999                              
American Countries                                               
(Millions of Dollars)
Country 
1998  1999 
Exports  Imports  Balance  Exports Imports  Balance   44
 
       Source:  PROCOMER 
 
 
China  0.4  0.0  0.4  0.6  0.0  0.6 
Korea  22.2  0.0  22.2  35.0  0.0  35.0 
Japon  32.9  30.3  2.6  104.2  49.7  54.5 
Malaysia  114.5  5.5  109.1  62.8  6.0  56.8 
Hong Kong  31.4  0.1  31.4  28.3  9.9  18.4 
Phillipines  5.8  8.4  -2.6  30.5  0.0  30.5 
Imports  Exports 
1999 
Balance  Balance
Table 6-9                                                       
INTEL Exports and Imports 1998 - 1999                              
Asian Countries                                                  
(Millions of Dollars)
Country 
1998 
Exports Imports   45
 
   
 
Source:  PROCOMER 
 
Germany  37.0  0.5  36.5  1.0  0.1  0.9 
Switzerland  0.4  0.0  0.4  0.0  0.8  -0.8 
United Kindom  100.4  0.7  99.7  320.1  0.0  320.1 
Ireland  11.7  0.0  11.7  36.7  0.1  36.6 
Italy  16.1  0.7  15.4  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Imports  Exports 
1999 
Balance  Balance 
Table 6-10                                                           
INTEL Exports and Imports 1998 - 1999                                     
European Countries                                                     
(Millions of Dollars) 
Country 
1998 
Exports  Imports   46
 
Table 6-11 
Composition of Costa Rica's Exports 1999
 
  
Without 
Intel 
With      
Intel 
USA  49  51 
México  2  2 
Canada  1  1 
Rest of America 26  16 
European Union 18  21 
Rest of Europe  1  1 
Asia  2  6 
Others  1  1 
   100  100 
   Source:  PROCOMER 
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Table 6-12 
Intel Suppliers in the Survey by Activity 
 Frequency Percentage Cumulative  percentage
Packing   4 9,3  9,3 
Aluminum  4 4,7  14 
Lithographic products  9 20,9  34,9 
Products and reparation of  metal-
mechanical parts 
5 11,6  46,5 
Furniture  3 7  53,5 
Gas bottling  2 4,7  58,1 
Computing Products (software, 
hardware) 
2 4,7  62,8 
Architecture  2 4,7  67,4 
Office appliances  3 7  74,4 
Electronic equipment  2 4,7  79,1 
Products for industrial maintenance  2 4,7  83,7 
Painting and construction  2 4,7  88,4 
Plastic  1 2,3  90,7 
Uniforms  1 2,3  93,0 
Other appliances  1 2,3  95,3 
Optics  1 2,3  97,7 
Security  1 2,3  100, 
Total 43,0  100,0   
Source: Authors´ calculation  from survey results. 
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Graph 6-5 
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